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CELLPHONES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
WHY CELLPHONE USERS HAVE A REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THEIR LOCATION
INFORMATION
Paul Cividanes*
The Fourth Amendment, which affords individuals protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures, was ratified over two
hundred years ago. As such, it was impossible for the Amendment’s
framers to conceive the technologies that exist today. As technology
progresses, courts are often faced with the task of deciding how the
Fourth Amendment should apply in the modern world. As Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has developed, the Supreme Court has
originated tests and doctrines for courts to use when hearing Fourth
Amendment challenges to government action. One such test, the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test, looks to see whether an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in what the
government has searched or seized. If the individual does in fact
have such an expectation, law enforcement can search and/or seize
that item only if they have a warrant, with some exceptions. One
doctrine the court has announced, the third-party doctrine, stands
for the proposition that individuals do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily convey to
third parties. Cellphones, and similar devices the Framers never
could have imagined, are now capable of revealing users’ location
information. This Note argues that Fourth Amendment protections
should be extended to location information. Ultimately, cellphone
users do not voluntarily convey their location information to third
parties and therefore have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
this information.
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INTRODUCTION
The first mobile phone call was made on April 3, 1973 by
Motorola senior engineer Martin Cooper to inform a rival
telecommunications company that he was making the call via a
mobile phone.1 Mr. Cooper made the call on the Motorola DynaTac
which was released for sale in 1983, weighed nearly two pounds,
allowed thirty minutes of talk time and eight hours of standby, could
store up to thirty phone numbers, and cost nearly $4,000.2 The
earliest cellphones were primarily capable of only making and
receiving calls, and were mainly used for business, as opposed to
personal use.3 Mobile phone technology started to improve in the
1990s and it became more common for the average consumer to
have a cellphone.4 Eventually, the cellphone’s purpose began to
shift from a “verbal communication tool to a multimedia tool.”5
Today, cellphones weigh mere ounces and can often replace other
gadgets such as cameras and music players.6 Cellphones additionally
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2017. Thank you to my family, friends,
and girlfriend Lauryn for always supporting me. Thank you to everybody on the
Journal of Law and Policy and Professor Baer for all of their suggestions and
contributions made while writing and editing this Note.
1 Richard Goodwin, The History of Mobile Phones From 1973 to 2008: The
Handsets That Made It All Happen, KNOW YOUR MOBILE (Apr. 16, 2015),
http://www.knowyourmobile.com/nokia/nokia-3310/19848/history-mobile-
phones-1973-2008-handsets-made-it-all-happen.
2 See id.; Evolution of Cell Phone Technology, ENGINEERING&TECH. HIST.
WIKI, http://ethw.org/Evolution_of_Cell_Phone_Technology (last modified Oct.
8, 2014); Nicole Nguyen, The Evolution of the Cell Phone – How Far It’s Come!,
READWRITE (July 4, 2014), http://readwrite.com/2014/07/04/cell-phone-
evolution-popsugar.
3 Amanda Ray, The History and Evolution of Cell Phones, ART INSTITUTES
BLOG (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.artinstitutes.edu/about/blog/the-history-and-
evolution-of-cell-phones.
4 Goodwin, supra note 1.
5 Ray, supra note 3.
6 Id.; Evolution of Cell Phone Technology, supra note 2; see Kara Cullen,
History of Cellphone Technology, QRREADERS.NET,
http://www.qrreaders.net/articles/history-cellphone-technology.html (last visited
Oct. 10, 2016); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (noting
that there are over a million apps for such things as political news, addictions,
dating, buying or selling items and other personal hobbies).
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include features such as text messaging, email, Internet, the ability
to update one’s social media status, and access to a mobile
application market that has “transformed the phone into a virtual
toolbox with a solution for almost every need.”7 There are currently
an estimated 207.2 million cellphone users in the United States.8
Another feature of modern cellphones is location-based
services.9 Location-based services allow cellphone users to share
their location with friends on services such as Google Plus and
Foursquare.10Despite some of these apps featuring the option to turn
off location services,11 cellphone companies are constantly
recording users’ locations,12 a feature that “cannot be turned off.”13
One way cellphone companies record their users’ locations is by
keeping historical cell site location information (“CSLI”) records.14
Every time a person sends or receives a phone call, text message,
email, or uses data, a record is kept of which cell tower their phone
7 Ray, supra note 3; see Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490; Cullen, supra note 6;
Evolution of Cell Phone Technology, supra note 2.
8 Number of Smartphone Users in the United States From 2010 to 2018 (In
Millions), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/201182/forecast-of-
smartphone-users-in-the-us/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
9 Kathryn Zickhur, Location-Based Services, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 12,
2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/12/location-based-services/.
10 Id.; see Noam Cohen, It’s Tracking Your Every Move and You May Not
Even Know, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/business/media/26privacy.html.
11 See Zickhur, supra note 9 (noting that cellphone users report they have
“turned off location-tracking features at some point”).
12 Cohen, supra note 10.
13 Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, ACLU (Mar. 25,
2013) (emphasis added), https://www.aclu.org/cases/cell-phone-location-tracking-
public-records-request [hereinafter Cell Phone Location Tracking]; see also Amy
Gahran, Survey: Most Cell Phone Users Don’t Protect Mobile Privacy, CNN
(Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/05/tech/mobile/pew-mobile-
privacy-gahran/ (“[R]egardless of whether you turn off location tracking on your
phone, your wireless carrier knows (and keeps a record of) where your phone is
at all times it’s connected to the cell network.”); Cohen, supra note 10 (“[W]e are
already being tracked whether we volunteer to or not.”).
14 Robinson Meyer, This Very Common Cellphone Surveillance Still Doesn’t
Require a Warrant, ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/sixth-circuit-cellphone-
tracking-csli-warrant/478197/.
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connects to.15 Every time a phone connects to a cell tower, a CSLI
record is kept and stored by the cellphone company.16Consequently,
the Government can procure CSLI records and use them against a
criminal defendant to place them at or nearby a crime scene.17
Currently, CSLI is not given Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures by any federal circuit. In
United States v. Davis, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
relying on a recent Fifth Circuit decision and a federal statute,18 held
that the government’s warrantless procurement of CSLI does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.19 The court reasoned that a person
has “no subjective or objective reasonable expectation of privacy”
in CSLI information.20 Additionally, the court relied on the third-
party doctrine, which states that “a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties” to find that a user does not have an expectation of
privacy in CSLI records.21 The court found that since the defendant
knew his cellphone provider was keeping CSLI records, he could
not claim any expectation of privacy.22 The court also found that the
government properly secured a court order under the Stored
15 See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 637 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2013) (“As mobile
devices register with a cell site, make a call, or download data, they
‘communicate’ with a station through radio signal data that is collected and
analyzed at the provider’s cell towers.”).
16 Id. at 632; Tim Sheehan, Note, Taking the Third-Party Doctrine Too Far:
Why Cell Phone Tracking Data Deserves Fourth Amendment Protection, 13 GEO.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 183 (2015).
17 Law enforcement has used CSLI in criminal investigations to place
robbery suspects at the scene of a crime. See generally United States v. Graham,
796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that obtaining CSLI cell cite constitutes a
search because the government is privy to information about the user’s
movements and personal habits); United States v. Davis 785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th
Cir. 2015) (holding that a court order compelling a cellphone provider to produce
CSLI records for a 67-day period did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
18 See Davis, 785 F.3d at 509–11.
19 Id. at 517.
20 Id. at 511.
21 Id. at 509 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)).
22 Id. at 511.
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Communications Act (“SCA”) to procure the records at issue.23 The
court noted that:
Under the SCA, Congress authorized the U.S.
Attorney to obtain court orders requiring “a provider
of electronic communication service . . . to disclose
a record or other information to a
subscriber” . . . [upon a showing] of “specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the . . . records or other
information sought [] are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.”24
For a brief moment, the Fourth Circuit gave CSLI Fourth
Amendment protection in United States v. Graham.25 The Fourth
Circuit originally held that the government’s warrantless
procurement of CSLI violated the Fourth Amendment.26 The court
reasoned that cellphone users had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in CSLI information and therefore inspection of such
information required a warrant.27 On rehearing en banc, however,
the Fourth Circuit held that the Government’s procurement of CSLI
from the defendant’s cellphone provider did not in fact violate the
Fourth Amendment.28 Similar to the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in
Davis, the court found that the third-party doctrine did apply to CSLI
and found that cellphone users do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in such information.29 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit refused
to afford cellphone users’ Fourth Amendment protection in their
23 Id.
24 Id. at 505 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (c)–(d) (2009)).
25 See generally United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016)
(finding no violation of defendants’ Fourth Amendment right where the
government received historical CSLI from defendants’ cell phone provider
without a warrant). The case was reheard after the government’s petition seeking a
rehearing en banc was granted. Orin Kerr, Opinion, Fourth Circuit Grants
Rehearing, Eliminates Split, on Cell-Site Surveillance, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/10/29/fourth-circuit-
grants-rehearing-eliminates-split-on-cell-site-surveillance/?utm_term=.ca9581a2c0cc.
26 United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 824
F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016).
27 Id. at 345.
28 Graham, 824 F.3d at 424.
29 Id. at 425, 428.
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location information and found that users are aware that cellphone
use results in a voluntarily conveyance of CSLI to cellphone
providers.30 These circuit opinions are illustrative of the prevailing
thought among the circuits not to extend Fourth Amendment
protection to the procurement of CSLI.
This Note argues that the third-party doctrine should be revisited
in its application to CSLI as well as other modern technologies.
CSLI is rarely knowingly volunteered to a third-party; as such,
cellphone users do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this
information and the procurement of CSLI should require a warrant.
Part I provides a brief overview of what CSLI is and how it is used.
Part II outlines related Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which
serves as a foundation for how courts determine whether a search is
unreasonable and therefore requires a warrant. Part III illustrates the
origins of the third-party doctrine and its application. Part IV
discusses recent circuit court opinions holding that CSLI is not
protected under the Fourth Amendment. Part V demonstrates how
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI
information on the grounds that such information can reveal
intimate details about a person’s life. Part VI argues that the third-
party doctrine should not apply to CSLI. Part VII proposes solutions
to the problems that arise from the application of the third-party
doctrine in the modern world. The doctrine requires reevaluation to
discern whether additional requirements or guidelines are necessary
in order to preserve Fourth Amendment protections. Ultimately,
courts should use a multifactor test to determine if the doctrine
should apply.
I. CELL SITE LOCATION INFORMATION
A cellphone user’s location is constantly recorded when the
phone is on, whether the user voluntarily shares that information or
not and even when the user is unaware that their location is being
recorded.31Once a cellphone is turned on, it begins to search for and
30 See In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell
Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 613–15 (5th Cir. 2013).
31 See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 641, 657 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2013).
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then connects to the cell site that will provide the strongest signal.32
The process occurs automatically and every seven seconds
cellphones search for the site with the strongest signal.33 The process
also occurs whenever a cellphone user makes a call, sends a text
message, or connects to the Internet.34 Cellphones can even be
tracked when the user takes no action at all, so long as the phone is
turned on.35 Cellphone providers also record a cellphone’s
registration data, by producing a log of all the cell sites the cellphone
has registered with.36 All of this information is recorded in a
database and a log is kept for each time a call is made or data is used
which can be analyzed to approximate the phone’s location at a
particular time.37 These records “comprise the bulk of CSLI.”38
As cellphone use became more frequent, the placement of cell
towers grew rapidly, leading to greater accuracy in location
information.39 The precision of recording a cellphone user’s location
varies depending on the size of the “cell sector,”which is the overall
area the cell tower covers.40 Phones that are used “in smaller sectors
can be located with greater accuracy than those in larger ones.”41
Historically, in the first cellular systems, the base stations were
generally placed far apart, creating large cell sectors that could
potentially cover an area several miles or more in diameter.42 Due
to today’s ubiquitous use of cellphones, the size of cell sectors has
generally decreased, as a sector can only handle so many
connections in the limited amount of space allocated to a wireless






38 Elizabeth Elliot, United States v. Jones: The (Hopefully Temporary)
Derailment of Cell-Site Location Information Protection, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
1, 7 (2013).
39 See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and
Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12–30 (2010)
[hereinafter ECPA Reform] (statement of Professor Matt Blaze).
40 Id. at 23–24.
41 Id. at 24.
42 Id.
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carrier within a given sector.43 This has led to more cellular base
stations with a corresponding decrease in the area served by each
station.44 As a result, carriers are able to locate users with greater
precision and accuracy.45
CSLI data is constantly being collected by cellphone carriers.46
During a criminal investigation, the government may seek
disclosure of “historical” CSLI, “real time” CSLI, or both.47 When
the government obtains historical CSLI, they are given location
information that already exists, and when they obtain real time CSLI
information, they are given location information as soon as it
becomes available to the phone provider.48 As the government will
ultimately obtain both from the cellphone provider, the distinction
is of no real substance to the provider.49 However, both forms of
CSLI “become[] important in relation to the privacy interest” of the
cellphone user.50 Real time CSLI can be used by law enforcement
to track a person’s movements and locations as they are happening,
whereas historical CSLI can be used to recreate a person’s
movements or place them at a certain location at a certain time.51
There is a potential for abuse with access to this information,
however, as an individual’s locations and movements may reveal
many intimate details about a person, leading one to have a
43 See id.
44 Id. at 25.
45 State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2013).
46 See Steven M. Harkins, Note, CSLI Disclosure: Why Probable Cause is
Necessary to Protect What’s Left of the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1875, 1883 (2011); see also Earls, 70 A.3d at 637 (noting that location
information can be recorded whether the cell phone user is using the phone or not,
so long as the phone is turned on).
47 Harkins, supra note 46, at 1883.
48 Id. at 1884.
49 Id. at 1883–84.
50 Id. at 1884.
51 See id.; see also Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns
Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 307, 310–11 (2004) (describing how law enforcement was able to rebut
Scott Peterson’s statement that he left his house at 9:30 by introducing “cell phone
records [that] placed him at home until 10:08”).
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reasonable expectation of privacy in such information.52 Thus, the
Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures should extend to CSLI.
II. FOURTHAMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.53
One of the main concerns the Framers had when ratifying the
Fourth Amendment was prohibiting the utilization of general
warrants and writs of assistance that were used under English
common law.54 General warrants allowed the Crown’s messengers
to conduct a search without providing any reason or belief that
someone had committed an offense.55 Similarly, writs of assistance
permitted a search for untaxed goods.56 These practices were
unsuccessfully challenged in court, and some, such as John Adams,
considered this legal battle the “spark that led to the Revolution.”57
“Both controversies led to the famous notion that a person’s home
is their castle, not easily invaded by the government.”58 Since its
52 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (noting that location information can reveal a “wealth of detail about
[an individual’s] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations”).
53 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
54 Barry Friedman & Orin Kerr, Common Interpretation – The Fourth
Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR., http://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
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ratification in 1791,59 the Fourth Amendment has been the center of
much debate among scholars and courts.
The Supreme Court originally took a property-based approach
to interpreting Fourth Amendment protections.60 Historically, “the
sanctity of the home” has firmly been established, and is one of the
oldest strains of Fourth Amendment law.61 The Court has
consistently used this doctrine throughout Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, “drawing a ‘firm line’” at an individual’s home and
distinguishing privacy within the home and the public nature outside
of it.62 The Court can be somewhat particular about this line, as a
search that occurs right outside the home, also known as curtilage,
is afforded Fourth Amendment protections, while a search a little
further away, considered to be outside of the curtilage, might not be
afforded protection under the Fourth Amendment.63 The property-
based approach can be considered relatively simple as one can draw
a “neat distinction between public and private.”64
59 Id.
60 Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and
The Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247, 258 (2016).
61 Id.
62 Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
63 See id. at 258–59. Compare Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180
(1984) (“At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate
activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,’
and therefore has been considered part of the home for Fourth Amendment
purposes.”), and Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (holding that police
bringing a drug-sniffing dog onto a man’s porch is considered to be a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and thus, given Fourth Amendment
protection), with California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that
police going through garbage left outside of the curtilage is not protected under
the Fourth Amendment because a person has no expectation of privacy in
“garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street [that] are readily accessible
to animals, children, scavengers, snoops and other members of the public”). The
Court has provided four factors to consider when determining whether an area is
within curtilage. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987)
(“[C]urtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four
factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the
area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses
to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
observation by people passing by.”).
64 Price, supra note 60, at 259.
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When the Fourth Amendment was ratified in the eighteenth
century,65 it is unlikely that its drafters envisioned modern
technological advancements of today. Thus, as new technologies
began to emerge, the Court had to decide how the Fourth
Amendment would apply in light of these new advancements. In
1928, the Supreme Court had to make such a decision in Olmstead
v. United States.66 In Olmstead, federal prohibition officers tapped
the defendant’s phone by placing wires along the ordinary telephone
wires outside of his residence.67 Strictly adhering to the property-
based approach, the Court held that the wire-tapping at issue did not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, noting that the
insertions were made without trespassing on the defendant’s
property.68 The Court reasoned that the wires were not a part of the
defendant’s home or office,69 declining to consider “how the
technology worked and the role it played in society.”70 In his dissent
inOlmstead, Justice Brandeis took issue with this approach, positing
that the Constitution is in essence a living document that must be
able to adapt to “a changing world.”71
Subsequently, in Goldman v. United States, the Supreme Court
ruled that law enforcement’s use of a detectaphone—a device that is
placed against a wall to pick up sounds—did not violate the Fourth
65 Friedman & Kerr, supra note 54.
66 See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (addressing whether evidence
obtained by secretly wiretapping a private phone call was done so in violation of
the Fourth Amendment).
67 Id. at 456–57.
68 Id. at 465–66.
69 Id. at 465.
70 Price, supra note 60, at 260.
71 SeeOlmstead, 277 U.S. at 472–73, overruled byKatz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Legislation, both statutory and
constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general
language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had
theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore a principal to be vital must be capable of wider application
than the mischief which gave it birth.” (quotingWeems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 373 (1910)).
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Amendment.72 In Goldman, federal agents were given access to the
defendant’s neighboring office by the building’s superintendent and
placed the detectaphone against the partitioning wall.73 The agents
were then able to hear statements made by the defendant, which
prosecutors later used against him for conspiracy to violate the
Bankruptcy Act.74 The Court refused to distinguish the wiretapping
inOlmstead and the use of the detectaphone, adhering to Olmstead’s
property-based approach by noting that what was heard by the
detectaphone was not a trespass.75 The Olmstead and Goldman
decisions were reflections of the Court’s former refusal to give
weight to new technology and how it functions in society and its
general reluctance to expand beyond the property-based approach.76
In 1928, the year the Court decided Olmstead, there were
approximately eighteen million phones being used in households
within the United States.77 By 1965, that number grew over five
times.78 Telephone use became a part of every-day life for
Americans, which meant that the Court would need to seriously
reconsider Olmstead if there was ever to be any privacy afforded to
telephone use.79 In 1967, the Court had the opportunity to do so
when deciding Katz v. United States.80 In Katz, FBI agents attached
an electronic listening and recording device to a phone booth used
by the defendant, which enabled them to overhear the calls he
made.81 The defendant insisted that the phone booth was a
72 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
73 Id. at 131–32.
74 Id. at 130, 132.
75 Id. at 134–35.
76 See Price, supra note 60, at 260.
77 Id. at 261 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, in COMMUNICATIONS 775, 783
(1970), http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970p2-05.pdf.
78 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, in COMMUNICATIONS 775, 783 (1970),
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970p2-05.pdf
(noting there were approximately 93.7 million telephones in American homes in
1965).
79 See Price, supra note 60, at 261.
80 Id.
81 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
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“constitutionally protected area,”82 however the lower court held
that the recordings did not violate the Fourth Amendment on the
grounds that there was “no physical entrance into the area occupied
by[] the [defendant].”83 On appeal, the Supreme Court found that
the defendant incorrectly framed the issue and noted, “the correct
solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily
promoted by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally protected
area.’”84 The majority opinion concluded that, “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.”85 The Court further noted
that what a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”86 The
majority explicitly overruled Olmstead and Goldman, stating that
the “‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded
as controlling,”87 and went on to hold that the government’s actions
were in violation of the Fourth Amendment.88
While the home and other property is still sufficiently protected
by the Fourth Amendment,89 Katz was an important decision
because it broadened Fourth Amendment protections and
established that such protections are not merely dictated by property
law.90 While groundbreaking, the majority opinion did not provide
much guidance to determine when such protections may exist.91
However, Justice Harlan provided such guidance in his concurrence:
“My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions
is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
82 Id. at 351.
83 Id. at 348–49.
84 Id. at 350.
85 Id. at 351.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 353.
88 See id. at 359.
89 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012)
(“Katz . . . established that ‘property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth
Amendment violations,’ but did not ‘snuf[f] out the previously recognized
protection for property.’” (quoting Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 64
(1992)).
90 See Price, supra note 60, at 264.
91 Id.
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that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”92 This two-part “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test has become the “litmus test” of Fourth Amendment protection.93
In recent years, the Supreme Court has considered technological
developments when deciding cases involving Fourth Amendment
challenges. In Kyllo v. United States, the Court considered whether
the government’s use of a thermal imaging device to detect heat
waves emanating from a defendant’s home was a search in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.94 The Court considered not only the
technology of the thermal imaging device at issue, but also other,
“more sophisticated systems that [were] already in use or in
development,” and found that the government’s warrantless use of
the device violated the Fourth Amendment.95 In Riley v. California,
the Court was asked “to decide how the search incident to arrest
doctrine applied to modern cellphones.”96 The Court considered the
immense storage capacity that modern cellphones have, which can
hold vast amounts of personal information, while further noting that
location information derived from cellphones can precisely
reconstruct a cellphone user’s whereabouts.97 As such, the Court
held that the search incident to arrest doctrine does not allow law
enforcement to search the digital contents of an arrestee’s cellphone
without a warrant.98
While the Court has yet to decide a case involving the
procurement of CSLI, these recent decisions indicate that the Court
will likely favorably consider technological progression when
hearing Fourth Amendment challenges. The procurement of CSLI
involves technology that the framers of the Fourth Amendment
could never have imagined, and courts should take this into account
when deciding whether to give CSLI Fourth Amendment
protections.
92 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
93 See Price, supra note 60 at 262.
94 See Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
95 Id. at 36–37, 40.
96 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
97 Id. at 2489–90.
98 Id. at 2493 (holding that it “is not that the information on a cell phone is
immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such
a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest”).
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III. THE THIRD-PARTYDOCTRINE
The third-party doctrine, which has been implemented in
criminal cases since the late 1970s, essentially establishes “that
information lawfully held by many third parties is treated differently
from information held by the suspect himself.”99 This information
can be procured “by subpoenaing the third party, by securing the
third party’s consent or by any other means of legal discovery.”100
A third party can include “any non-governmental institution or
entity established by law.”101 The two leading cases that established
this doctrine are United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland.102
In Miller, the defendant was on trial for defrauding the United
States of tax revenues, among other related charges.103 Prior to trial,
the defendant moved to “suppress copies of checks and other bank
records obtained by . . . allegedly defective subpoenas . . . served
upon two banks at which he had accounts.”104 The Court found that
the District Court correctly denied the motion to suppress, as there
was no intrusion into any area in which the defendant had a
protected Fourth Amendment interest.105 The Court noted that the
defendant could not claim ownership or possession of the records at
issue, finding that they were not the defendant’s “private papers,”
but rather business records that belonged to the banks.106 Since the
documents contained information that was voluntarily conveyed to
the banks, the Court found there was no legitimate “expectation of
privacy” in such documents.107 The Court also noted that an
99 Orin Kerr & Greg Nojeim, The Data Question: Should the Third-Party




101 Price, supra note 60, at 265.
102 Kerr & Nojeim, supra note 99.
103 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976).
104 Id. The defendant claimed “the subpoenas were defective because they
were issued by the United States Attorney rather than a court, no return was made
to a court, and the subpoenas were returnable on a date when the grand jury was
not in session.” Id. at 438–39.
105 Id. at 440.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 442.
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individual assumes the risk when revealing certain information to
others that it may be conveyed to the government, “even if that
information was revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party
will not be betrayed.”108
The Court expanded on the third-party doctrine in Smith v.
Maryland, where a robbery victim was receiving menacing
telephone calls from a man claiming to be the robber.109 The police
eventually discovered that the defendant was the one making the
calls,110 and “the telephone company, at the police’s request,
installed a pen register at its central offices to record the numbers
dialed from the telephone” at the defendant’s house.111 The police
did not have a warrant or court order directing the telephone
company to install the pen register.112 The police used the
information recorded by the pen register to obtain a warrant to
search the defendant’s residence, which revealed evidence
implicating him in the robbery.113 The Supreme Court found that the
defendant had no “legitimate expectation of privacy” in numbers
dialed on a phone.114 Similar to its holding inMiller, the Court noted
that the pen register was installed on company property and
therefore, the defendant could not claim that his property was
invaded.115
The Court further distinguished the records at issue in Katz from
the ones derived from a pen register and found that the listening
device employed in Katz revealed contents of communications,
whereas pen registers do not acquire any such content.116 Instead,
they disclose “only the telephone numbers that have been dialed—a
108 Id. at 443.
109 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
110 See id. (noting that during one call, the caller asked the robbery victim to
come outside, which allowed her to see the defendant’s car, enabling the police to




114 Id. at 745.
115 Id. at 741.
116 Id.
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means of establishing communication.”117 The majority expanded
on its reasoning as to why people have no expectation of privacy in
the numbers they dial, explaining that “[a]ll telephone users realize
that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company,”
and they also are aware that the phone company keeps permanent
records of such conveyances, albeit admitting that people may be
uninformed of pen registers’ mechanics.118 Relying on Miller, the
Court found that even if the defendant had a subjective expectation
of privacy in the numbers he dialed, that expectation was not “one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’”119 because a
“person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”120 The Court further held that
when the defendant “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to
the telephone company,” he assumed the risk of the company
possibly disclosing the numbers he dialed to the police.121
While the third-party doctrine has been criticized since its
inception,122 even stronger criticisms can be made in today’s modern
117 Id. (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977).
118 Id. at 742 (“Although most people may be oblivious to a pen register’s
esoteric functions, they presumably have some common awareness of one
common use: to aid in the identification of persons making annoying or obscene
calls.”); see also Stewart Baker, Drawing a Line on the Third-party Doctrine,
WASH. POST (May 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/05/04/drawing-a-line-on-the-third-party-doctrine (“The
theory of Smith is that I have a reduced privacy expectation in things [I have]
shared with others.”).
119 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
120 Id. at 743–45 (noting that the defendant voluntarily conveyed information
to the telephone company that had facilities for recording and was free to record);
see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
121 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
122 See id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that even assuming that
individuals typically know a phone company monitors calls for its own reasons,
it does not follow that they expect this information to be made available to the
general public or the government); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
449 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A bank customer’s reasonable expectation
is that, absent compulsion by legal process, the matters he reveals to the bank will
be utilized by the bank only for internal banking purposes. Thus, we hold
petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the bank would maintain the
confidentiality of those papers which originated with him in check form and of
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world. The amount of data that third parties collect today is arguably
“much more revealing than in the 1970s,” when the doctrine was
first articulated.123 Third parties can also collect more information
in today’s world because more information is stored online.124 In
light of the differences in information that is revealed to third parties
today, as compared to when the third-party doctrine was first
developed, the Court should revisit the doctrine’s application in
order to ensure that advancements in technology do not erode Fourth
Amendment protections.
IV. FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS ON CELL SITE LOCATION
INFORMATION
Currently, CSLI is not given Fourth Amendment protection by
any federal circuit. For a brief period of time, the Fourth Circuit held
that CSLI is protected under the Fourth Amendment,125 but that case
was reheard and the original decision was vacated.126 Similarly, both
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that CSLI is not afforded
Fourth Amendment protection.127
the bank statements into which a record of those same checks had been
transformed pursuant to internal bank practice.”).
123 Kerr & Nojeim, supra note 99.
124 See id.; see also Baker, supra note 118 (noting the mass amounts of data
people share on the Internet, especially by way of using smart phones); Price,
supra note 60, at 266 (“[M]odern technology has dramatically expanded the scope
of the third-party doctrine to reach far beyond records of bank transactions and
telephone calls.”); Natasha H. Duarte, The Home Out of Context: The Post-Riley
Fourth Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data, 93
N.C. L. REV. 1140, 1148 (2015) (“Now that most of our data is stored on third-
party servers, the Third-party Doctrine has effectively removed vast amounts of
digital data—much of which includes personal information—from Fourth
Amendment protection.”).
125 United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344–45 (4th Cir. 2015).
126 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (“A majority
of the panel held that, although the Government acted in good faith in doing so, it
had violated [d]efendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when it obtained the CSLI
without warrant . . . . We now hold that the Government’s acquisition of historical
CSLI from [d]efendant’s cell phone provider did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.”).
127 See generally United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015)
(holding that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI and
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In United States v. Davis, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether CSLI should be given Fourth Amendment
protection.128 The government, using the SCA, acquired a court
order compelling a robbery suspect’s cellphone provider to disclose
sixty-seven days’ worth of CSLI.129 The defendant’s motion to
suppress this evidence, arguing that the “records constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment and thus required probable cause and
a search warrant,”was denied.130 At trial, the police produced a map
showing the precise locations of the robberies as well as the cell
towers that connected the defendant’s calls around the time of the
robberies.131
The Eleventh Circuit held that the court order for the production
of the records at issue did not violate the Fourth Amendment.132
Similar to Miller, the court noted that the defendant could neither
claim ownership nor possession of the third-party’s CSLI business
records.133 The court also found that CSLI does not contain a
cellphone user’s private information as it is essentially “non-content
evidence.”134 The court, relying on the third-party doctrine and the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Smith and Miller, found that the
defendant had no subjective or objective reasonable expectation of
privacy in the CSLI records.135 The court reasoned that a cellphone
user has no subjective expectation of privacy because they know
they transmit signals to cell towers within the range of where the
cellphone is used, that the cell tower functions as the equipment that
connects the calls, that when users are making or receiving a call
therefore its procurement is not protected under the Fourth Amendment); In re
Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 613–
15 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that a cellphone user is aware that CSLI is voluntarily
conveyed to a cellphone provider and is therefore not afforded Fourth Amendment
protections).
128 See generally United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015)
(holding that a court order compelling third-party business records containing
CSLI for a 67-day period did not violate Fourth Amendment rights).
129 Id. at 501–02.
130 Id. at 503.
131 Id. at 501.
132 Id. at 511.
133 Id.
134 Id. (emphasis omitted).
135 Id.
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they are exposing their general location, and that cellphone
companies keep records of such cell tower usage.136
The court also concluded that cellphone users do not have an
objective expectation of privacy in CSLI.137 The majority rejected
both the defendant’s and dissent’s reliance on the concurrences in
United States v. Jones, in which it was argued that CSLI is the
equivalent to GPS monitoring and thus requires the government to
show probable cause.138 The court distinguished GPS and CSLI,
noting that CSLI is less precise and that reasonable expectations of
privacy “do not turn on the quantity of non-content information” the
cellphone provider collected in CSLI records.139 Although the court
did admit that technology has evolved since the days of Smith and
Miller, it concluded that CSLI should not be given Fourth
Amendment protection due to the third-party doctrine’s
exclusionary effect.140 The court also recognized the pervasive use
of cellphones and the fact that some users may want to stop
cellphone providers from compiling location information or
producing it to the government, but stated that such proposals should
be directed to Congress rather than the courts.141
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit found that cellphone users have an
awareness and understanding that cellphone use results in a
voluntary conveyance of CSLI to cellphone providers and refused
to afford users Fourth Amendment protection in their location
information.142
In United States v. Graham, the Fourth Circuit originally held
that the government’s warrantless procurement of a robbery
136 Id.
137 Id. (noting that cellphone users know about publicly available
information regarding technologies and practices that phone companies use so
they should be aware of how cell towers function and that providers record such
cell tower usage).
138 Id. at 514; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding
that law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment when they placed a GPS
tracking device on a suspect’s vehicle without a proper warrant).
139 Davis, 785 F.3d. at 515.
140 Id. at 512.
141 Id. at 532.
142 See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data,
724 F.3d 600, 613–15 (5th Cir. 2013).
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suspects’ historical CSLI was an unreasonable search and therefore
violated the Fourth Amendment.143 The Court discussed how
“[e]xamination of a person’s historical CSLI . . . [allows] the
government to trace the movements of the cell phone . . . user,”
which would enable them to “discover the [user’s] private activities
and personal habits.”144 The court concluded that “cell phone users
have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in this
information [and] [i]ts inspection by the government, therefore,
requires a warrant, unless an established exception to the warrant
requirement applies.”145 The majority discussed how a Fourth
Amendment search can be achieved through inspection of third-
party records and decided that the third-party doctrine should not
apply to CSLI146 because “cell phone users do not voluntarily
convey their CSLI to their service providers.”147 Further, the court
explained how the third-party doctrine could hamper Fourth
Amendment rights and expectations of privacy as technology
continues to evolve.148
After the government asked the court to rehear the case en banc,
the Fourth Circuit held that the Government’s procurement of CSLI
from the defendant’s cellphone provider did not in fact violate the
Fourth Amendment.149 Similar to the Eleventh Circuit, the court
found that the third-party doctrine did apply to CSLI and that
cellphone users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
such information.150
Ultimately, courts should use the Fourth Circuit’s original
reasoning in Graham, and hold that CSLI should be protected under
the Fourth Amendment. CSLI reveals private details about an
143 See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2015).
144 Id. at 345.
145 Id.
146 See id. at 351–52.
147 Id. at 353–55 (noting some reasons why cell phone users do not
voluntarily convey CSLI, including: service providers automatically generate the
records, a user is not required to actively submit any location information when
using their phone and some cell phone users are not generally aware that the
records are being generated).
148 See id. at 358–60.
149 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424, 437–38 (4th Cir. 2016).
150 Id. at 428.
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individual which gives cellphone users a reasonable expectation of
privacy in such information.151Additionally, the third-party doctrine
should not apply to the procurement of CSLI as it can be reasoned
that cellphone users are not knowingly and voluntarily providing
third parties with this information.152
V. CELLPHONEUSERSHAVE AREASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY INCSLI RECORDS
Location information can reveal private information about an
individual.153 The Supreme Court decision inUnited States v. Jones,
although dealing with GPS records rather than CSLI,154 emphasized
how location data can reveal private information about an
individual. In Jones, government agents installed a GPS tracking
device on the defendant’s vehicle without a valid warrant.155 The
majority opinion strictly adhered to the property-based approach to
the Fourth Amendment, holding that because “[t]he government
physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
information,” the use of the GPS device on the defendant’s vehicle
to monitor its movements, constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment.156 It was Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion,
however, that illustrated just how much information location data
can reveal.157 Justice Sotomayor explained that “GPS monitoring
generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,
151 See infra Part V.
152 See infra Part VI.
153 SeeUnited States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955–56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
154 See generally Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (deciding a case where law
enforcement officers placed a GPS tracking device on defendant’s automotive
vehicle).
155 See id. at 948 (noting that the government did obtain a warrant to use a
tracking device, but did not follow the geographic or temporal limitations of the
warrant).
156 Id. at 949.
157 See id. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”158 The
information that is revealed from GPS monitoring can essentially be
equated with the information CSLI reveals, or any other location
data type record. In fact, “[g]iven the ubiquity of cell phones and the
fact people carry them almost everywhere they go—including inside
a home—cell site information can be even more revealing than GPS
information.”159 Either way, no matter the source, location data
reveals the same information—your location. And this location
information, no matter the source, reveals a variety of personal
details about an individual.160
Such information can paint a detailed portrait of one’s life,
revealing things such as when a person comes and goes and whether
they spent the night at home or elsewhere.161 Location information
can essentially reveal our various patterns of movement and who we
associate with.162 These recorded interactions can also lead to
inferences about an individual’s religious beliefs, sexual orientation,
and political affiliations.163 Certain inferences from location
information can be made; for example, a few visits to a doctor
specializing in treating a certain condition can lead to the conclusion
158 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). GPS, and location data in general,
can also reveal information such as “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon,
the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense
attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or
church, the gay bar and on and on.” Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)).
159 Hanni Fakhoury, From California to New York, Cell Phone Location
Records are Private, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 16, 2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/06/california-new-york-cell-phone-location-
records-are-private [hereinafter Fakhoury, From California to New York]; see
also Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 861 (Mass. 2014) (“[T]here is
a strong argument that CSLI raises even greater privacy concerns than a GPS
tracking device. In contrast to such a device attached to a vehicle, because a
cellular telephone is carried on the person of its user, it tracks the user’s location
far beyond the limitations of where a car can travel.” (citation omitted)).
160 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting some
establishments individuals visit which can be revealed through location
information).
161 Fakhoury, From California to New York, supra note 159.
162 See id.
163 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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that an individual has that condition.164 While it can be argued that
a one-time revelation of an individual’s location may not reveal
much about a person, multiple trips to a doctor or gynecologist, for
example, coupled with frequent trips to stores catering to new
mothers and infants could reveal that a woman is pregnant, a fact
she may deem private and not want to share with others. It is the
revelation of an individual’s location taken in the aggregate that
begins to paint a picture of one’s private life.
When the government procures CSLI an individual’s location is
not being revealed merely once, but rather at high volumes,
revealing months’ worth of a person’s movements.165 Courts
sometimes look at this under what has been termed the “mosaic
theory,” where they review the government’s collective action as a
whole, rather than looking at individual steps.166 Under this
approach, the collective action observed as a whole could constitute
a search whereas an individual action looked at in isolation would
not.167 This theory more suitably protects cellphone users’ privacy
expectations in CSLI, as individuals may be less concerned about
their location being revealed only once, as opposed to their every
move being revealed for weeks or months at a time. When location
164 See Elizabeth Dwoskin, What Secrets Your Phone is Sharing About You,
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 13, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023034530045792906321289291
94. Further inferences can be made, such as revealing sensitive political
information, showing certain leaders meeting, who may be involved and when
and where they gather. A person’s romantic life can be revealed by tracking the
location of cell phones at night. See Jane Mayer, What’s the Matter with
Metadata, NEWYORKER (June 6, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/whats-the-matter-with-metadata.
165 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948; United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 501–
02 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 349–50 (4th Cir.
2015). In Jones, law enforcement generated over two thousand pages of location
data through its GPS monitoring of the suspect. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. In Davis,
law enforcement procured sixty-seven days’ worth of location information from
a suspect’s cellphone provider. Davis 785 F.3d at 501–02. In Graham, law
enforcement procured two hundred twenty-one days’ worth of location
information from a suspect’s cellphone provider, revealing over twenty-eight
thousand location data points. Graham, 796 F.3d at 349–50.
166 Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of The Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 311, 313 (2013).
167 See id. at 328.
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information is aggregated over long periods of time, as opposed to
an individual location, intimate and private details about one’s life
can be revealed. As such, one would have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in this information.
As location information reveals intimate details about one’s life,
“it [is] clear that people . . . [would expect] location information . . . to
remain private” evenwhen it is stored by cellphone providers.168A 2014
study has further shown that “Americans expect privacy in the data
stored . . . and generated by their cellphones, including location
information.”169 According to that study, 82 percent of Americans
consider information revealing their location to be even more
sensitive than “their relationship history, religious or political views,
or the content of their text messages.”170
Of course, there are those who are less guarded about sharing
private or personal information with their social media friends and
followers.171 However, there is a difference between the location
information one chooses to broadcast on social media, such as going
168 Hanni Fakhoury, A National Consensus: Cell Phone Location Records
Are Private, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 29, 2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/constitutionally-important-consensus-
location-privacy [hereinafter Fakhoury, A National Consensus]; see also Brief for
Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, United
States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-12928), 2014WL 7006395
at 6 (en banc) (citing Dave Deasy, TRUSTe Study Reveals Smartphone Users
More Concerned About Mobile Privacy Than Brand or Screen Size, TRUSTE:
PRIVACY BLOG (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.truste.com/blog/2013/09/05/truste-
study-reveals-smartphone-usersmore-concerned-about-mobile-privacy-than-
brand-or-screen-size; JANICE Y. TSAI ET AL., CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV.,
LOCATION-SHARING TECHNOLOGIES: PRIVACY RISKS AND CONTROLS 12 (2010),
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/LBSprivacy/files/TsaiKelleyCranorSadeh_2009.pdf)
(noting that a significant number of cell phone users did not like the idea of being
tracked and some believe that the risks of location sharing outweigh the benefits
resulting in a concern about controlling who can access their location information).
169 Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant, Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (No. 12-12928), 2014 WL 7006395 at 5 (citing
MARYMADDEN, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN THE POST-
SNOWDEN ERA, PEW RES. CENTER 36–37 (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_1112
14.pdf).
170 Id. (citing MADDEN, supra note 169, at 36–37).
171 Fakhoury, A National Consensus, supra note 168.
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to a concert at the park to see the latest band, and the information
revealed from CSLI, such as going to the doctor, spending the night
at a mistress’ house, or any other place one would like to keep
private.172 The former is information people may actually want to
share with others, or at the very least may not mind if it is revealed
to the public, while the latter is information that one may hope
remains private. CSLI does not distinguish between the two forms and
reveals all location information that is stored by the cellphone provider.
Many cellphone users are taking affirmative steps to keep their
location information private,173 evidencing that they have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in location data. Although some
individuals broadcast their location to the world by posting pictures
or using social media, there are many people who not only make
sure that they do not post such information, but take steps to ensure
that companies do not gain access to certain information they deem
private.174 Studies reveal that some cellphone users will not use an
app when they realize how much personal information must be
disclosed in order to use it.175 Studies also show that cellphone users
are turning off location tracking features.176While the CSLI tracking
172 See id.
173 See Brief as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, supra note 169, at 5–
6 (citing LAURENBOYLES ET AL., PRIVACY ANDDATAMANAGEMENT ONMOBILE
DEVICES, PEWRES. CTR. 8–9 (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-
media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_MobilePrivacyManagement.pdf).
174 BOYLES ET AL., supra note 173, at 2 (“Many cell phone users take steps
to manage, control, or protect the personal data on their mobile devices.”).
175 See id. (“54% of app users have decided to not install a cell phone app
when they discovered how much personal information they would need to share
in order to use it . . . 30% of app users have uninstalled an app that was already
on their cell phone because they learned it was collecting personal information
that they [did not] wish to share . . . . Taken together, 57% of all app users have
either uninstalled an app over concerns about having to share their personal
information, or declined to install an app in the first place for similar reasons.”).
176 See id. (“19% of cell owners have turned off the location tracking feature
on their cell phone because they were concerned that other individuals or
companies could access that information.”); Zickhur, supra note 9 (“[A]lmost half
(46%) of teen app users say [that] they have turned off the location tracking
feature on their cell phone or in an app on a phone or tablet because they were
worried about other people or companies being able to access that information . .
. . [O]ver a third (35%) of adult cell app users said they have turned off the
location-tracking feature on their cell phones.”).
CELLPHONES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 343
function of cellphones cannot be turned off,177 the fact that people
are taking affirmative steps to prevent location information from
being made public illustrates that cellphone users maintain an
expectation of privacy in such records. Although this information is
exposed to the cellphone providers, a cellphone user’s subjective
expectation of privacy is not diminished for this reason, and
cellphone users can still maintain an objective expectation of
privacy in location information, effectively satisfying the test set out
in Katz.178
Increasingly more states have attested that cellphone users have
a reasonable, objective expectation of privacy in CSLI. A number of
state legislatures are now requiring warrants for location data
records, as well as CSLI.179 Several state courts have also ruled that
CSLI and other location information is essentially private
information that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in,
177 See Cell Phone Location Tracking, supra note 13 (“All cell phones
register their location with cell phone networks several times a minute, and this
function cannot be turned off while the phone is getting a wireless signal.”); see
also Amy Gahran, supra note 13 (“[R]egardless of whether you turn off location
tracking on your phone, your wireless carrier knows (and keeps a record of) where
your phone is at all times it’s connected to the cell network.”); Cohen, supra note
10 (noting that cell phone users are continuously being tracked whether they
volunteer to or not).
178 See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellant, supra note 168.
179 See Fakhoury, A National Consensus, supra note 168. “Hawaii, New
York, Oregon and Washington require police to [obtain] a search warrant to track
a person’s movement using GPS or other electronic tracking device.” Id.After the
concurring opinions in United States v. Jones recognized that people can expect
information about their movements will remain private, “Colorado, Maine,
Minnesota, Montana and Utah passed statutes requiring law enforcement to use a
search warrant to obtain historical cell site information. Indiana, Virginia, and
Wisconsin” require law enforcement to obtain “a warrant . . . to track a cell phone
in real time.” Id. Riverside County, California, Denver, Wichita and Lexington,
Kentucky require police to show probable cause and obtain a warrant when they
track mobile phones. Cell Phone Location Tracking, supra note 13. The
California legislature is also considering legislation “that would require police to
obtain a warrant to get location records and other kinds of digital data.” Fakhoury,
From California to New York, supra note 159.
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and therefore should be protected by the Fourth Amendment.180 For
instance, in People v. Weaver, the New York Court of Appeals ruled
that the government infringed a burglary suspect’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in his location information by placing a GPS
tracking device on his vehicle.181 As one can conclude that CSLI
contains more revealing information than GPS, the court’s
reasoning is applicable to CSLI as well.182 In State v. Earls, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that its State Constitution “protects an
individual’s privacy interest in the location of his or her cellphone,”
and “users are reasonably entitled to expect confidentiality in the
ever-increasing level of detail that cellphones can reveal about their
lives.”183 In Commonwealth v. Augustine, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court noted that historical CSLI allows the government to
“track and reconstruct a person’s past movements, a category of
information that never would be available through the use of
traditional law enforcement tools of investigation.”184 The court
held that the defendant had satisfied the Katz “reasonable
expectation” test by showing that he had a subjective expectation of
privacy interest that “society is prepared to recognize as reasonable”
in the location information revealed in the CSLI records.185
Similarly, in Tracey v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that
CSLI implicates both a subjective expectation of privacy and one
that “society is now prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable
180 Lauren E. Babst, Note, No More Shortcuts: Protect Cell Site Location
Data With a Warrant Requirement, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 363, 382
(2015).
181 People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1201 (N.Y. 2009).
182 Fakhoury, From California to New York, supra note 159 (“Weaver should
apply to cell site location records too, regardless of the fact that the cell phone
service providers hold the records. Given the ubiquity of cell phones and the fact
people carry them almost everywhere they go—including inside a home—cell site
information can be even more revealing than GPS information.”).
183 State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013) (“Because of the nature of
the intrusion, and the corresponding, legitimate privacy interest at stake, [the court
held] . . . that police must obtain a warrant based on a showing of probable cause,
or qualify for an exception to the warrant requirement, to obtain tracking
information through the use of a cell phone.”).
184 Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 865 (Mass. 2014).
185 Id. at 856–57.
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under the Katz ‘reasonable expectation of privacy test.’”186 The fact
that many states are providing location privacy protections to its
citizens through statutes and court decisions illustrates that it is
reasonable to expect this location information to remain private.187
Admittedly, states can afford more protection than the U.S.
constitutional baseline,188 and “[w]hile the Fourth Amendment does
not depend on state law or statutory guarantees, they are nonetheless
compelling evidence of societal understandings of privacy.”189 The
decisions made by state courts and legislatures provide strong
support for the assertion that cellphone users do, in fact, have an
objective expectation of privacy in CSLI and similar location
information.
Location data can reveal very personal details about one’s life,
details that users expect to remain private. Although there is no
option to prevent cellphone companies from recording CSLI,
cellphone users are taking affirmative steps to prevent their location
information from being made public.190 Additionally, state courts
and legislatures are expressly telling people that they have a
reasonable expectation of privacy through statutes and court
decisions. These trends demonstrate that cellphone users have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI and similar location
information and procurement of such information should therefore
require a warrant.
186 Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967)).
187 See Fakhoury, From California to New York, supra note 159.
188 See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1202 (N.Y. 2009).
189 Fakhoury, A National Consensus, supra note 168.
190 See BOYLES ET AL., supra note 174 (“19% of cell owners have turned off
the location tracking feature on their cell phone because they were concerned that
other individuals or companies could access that information.”); see also Zickhur,
supra note 9 (“[A]lmost half (46%) of teen app users say that they have turned off
the location tracking feature on their cell phone or in an app on a phone or tablet
because they were worried about other people or companies being able to access
that information . . . . [O]ver a third (35%) of adult cell app users said they have
turned off the location-tracking feature on their cell phones.”).
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VI. THE THIRD-PARTYDOCTRINE SHOULDNOTAPPLY TO CELL
SITE LOCATION INFORMATION
The third-party doctrine states “that information lawfully held
by many third parties is treated differently from information held by
the suspect himself.”191 Foundational case law for the doctrine has
articulated that, “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”192 The
underlying theory of the third-party doctrine is that an individual has
a “reduced privacy expectation in things [they have] shared with
others.”193 This theory has been criticized since the doctrine was
first introduced.194 Presumably, most individuals would not expect
that information they share with others would be shared with law
enforcement. It would not follow that, because CSLI is produced to
the cellphone companies, you would have a reduced expectation of
privacy in those records. Further, it is reasonable to expect that the
company will not share your location with others, unless they are
ordered to do so after being presented with a warrant. Another issue
is whether cellphone users voluntarily give these records over to the
cellphone company. CSLI is automatically generated and produced
to the phone company,195 and it is questionable whether users are
even aware that this process is taking place.
191 Kerr & Nojeim, supra note 99.
192 United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 352–53 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979)).
193 Baker, supra note 118.
194 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“[A]ssuming . . . that individuals ‘typically know’ that a phone
company monitors calls for internal reasons . . . it does not follow that they expect
this information to be made available to the public in general or the
government.”); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 449 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“A bank customer’s reasonable expectation is that, absent
compulsion by legal process, the matters he reveals to the bank will be utilized by
the bank only for internal banking purposes. Thus, we hold petitioner had a
reasonable expectation that the bank would maintain the confidentiality of those
papers which originated with him in check form and of the bank statements into
which a record of those same checks had been transformed pursuant to internal
bank practice.”).
195 See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 636 (N.J. 2013).
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The third-party doctrine does not categorically exclude all
records from Fourth Amendment protection, but rather, the doctrine
simply states that a person cannot claim a legitimate expectation of
privacy in information that they voluntarily convey to third
parties.196 It is this voluntary conveyance that triggers an assumption
of risk and reduced expectation of privacy.197 CSLI records do not
trigger this assumption of risk or reduced expectation of privacy
because CSLI is automatically generated,198 a feature that cannot be
turned off by the cellphone user.199 A cellphone user does not take
any affirmative steps to disclose their location to their cellphone
provider; rather, the company records users’ location regardless of
consent.200 CSLI are records that simply wind up in the hands of a
third party, not one in which a person voluntary conveys
information. Also, CSLI is recorded when a user receives a call or
text message.201 In this case, a cellphone user is not affirmatively
acting, much less making a voluntary conveyance.202 The automatic
generation of CSLI is no more than a byproduct of having a
cellphone, and this act cannot be regarded as a voluntary
conveyance triggering a reduced expectation of privacy.203
Another issue in the application of the third-party doctrine to
CSLI records is whether cellphone users are even aware that such
information is being generated. The Third Circuit has noted that, “it
is unlikely that cell phone customers are aware that their cellphone
providers collect and store historical location information.”204
Additionally, scholars have noted that, “[m]ost people are not aware
of just how much data cellphone companies are storing and for how
196 Graham, 796 F.3d at 354.
197 Id.
198 See Earls, 70 A.3d at 637.
199 Cell Phone Location Tracking, supra, note 13; Gahran, supra note 13.
200 See Graham, 796 F.3d at 355.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See Babst, supra note 180, at 389.
204 In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun.
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3rd Cir. 2010).
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long.”205 It is difficult to argue that a user voluntarily conveys
information to a third party when he/she is unaware that such
information is being conveyed at all.
A typical response to this argument is that cellphone users are
given fair warning in their cellphone contracts that cellphone
providers will collect location information and, if necessary, turn
that information over to law enforcement.206 This argument lacks
merit however, on the ground that “studies have shown that users of
electronic communications services often do not read or understand
their providers’ privacy policies.”207 In fact, even Chief Justice
Roberts admits that he usually does not read user agreements
necessary to access certain websites.208 Moreover, cellphone
companies do not typically disclose just how much information they
actually collect,209 and will not provide a cellphone user with their
own location information even if requested.210 It thus seems unlikely
that cellphone users will have a true understanding of what
information is being collected. Even if a cellphone user would like
to analyze the location information cellphone companies collect,
he/she will not be able to do so under current carrier practices.
205 R. Craig Curtis et al., Using Technology the Founders Never Dreamed
Of: Cell Phones as Tracking Devices and The Fourth Amendment, 4 U. DENV.
CRIM. L. REV. 61, 63 (2014).
206 See Babst, supra note 180, at 391.




commission-staff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf (noting that consumers
were not aware of how cellphone providers collect and use information derived
from their cellphones); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of
Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J. L & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 544 (2009)
(noting that privacy policies are often difficult to read and usually go unread).
208 Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits He Doesn’t Read the
Computer Fine Print, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 20, 2014),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_roberts_admits_he_doesn
t_read_the_computer_fine_print/.
209 Cohen, supra note 10.
210 See Megha Rajagopalan, Cellphone Companies Will Share Your Location
Data – Just Not With You, PRO PUBLICA (June 27, 2012),
https://www.propublica.org/article/cellphone-companies-will-share-your-location-
data-just-not-with-you.
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Lastly, the third-party doctrine should be revisited, as its
application in today’s technologically advanced world may pose a
threat to Fourth Amendment protections. Justice Sotomayor, in her
concurring opinion in Jones, stated that the third-party doctrine
approach is “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the
course of carrying out mundane tasks.”211 The third-party doctrine,
established in the 1970s212 during the Carter administration,213 was
introduced in the context of “analog-era,”214 “primitive . . . technology,”
such as “a pen register that recorded the phone numbers a person
dialed from a stationary phone.”215 The amount of data that winds
up with third parties today is potentially much more revealing than
when the doctrine was established in 1970.216 Pen registers, the
device at issue when the doctrine was first established, only reveal
the phone numbers a user dialed;217 CSLI can potentially track your
every move.218 This is problematic because, while some information
can be deduced just by the numbers you dialed, such as perhaps a
relationship with the user at the other end, knowing somebody’s
location and daily movements can reveal a wide range of intimate
details about one’s life. The doctrine also applies to the enormous
amount of data that one shares on the Internet.219 Today, most of our
data is stored on a third-party server.220 If all of this information can
be obtained without a warrant, there is a grave risk that our Fourth
Amendment privacy protections are effectively meaningless in the
211 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
212 See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (showing that
this was the first case to fully assert the third-party doctrine); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979) (applying the third-party doctrine to a technological device).
213 See Fakhoury, From California to New York, supra note 159.
214 Id.
215 Cindy Cohn & Hanni Fakhoury, With Third Party Records, Privacy
Doesn’t Require Secrecy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (May 7, 2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/third-party-records-privacy-doesnt-
require-secrecy.
216 Kerr & Nojeim, supra note 99.
217 Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
218 Cohn & Fakhoury, supra note 215.
219 See Baker, supra note 118.
220 Duarte, supra note 124, at 1148.
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context of information generated through different forms of modern
technology.221
One may respond to these assertions by arguing that one can
choose simply to not use a cellphone if they are concerned about
their privacy, and if they do use a cellphone, they assume the risk
that such information may be disclosed to law enforcement.222
Cellphones, however, are ubiquitous223 and now a “necessary part
of [modern] life for many people.”224 “[T]oday, 90 percent of
Americans carry cell phones.”225 Cellphones are “increasingly
viewed as necessary to social interactions as well as the conduct of
business.”226 The Supreme Court has even noted that, “cell
phones . . . are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life
that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an
important feature of human anatomy.”227 A 2013 study showed that
cellphone users use their phone in almost any place and any time
imaginable, including in the shower, during sex, and at church.228
The only way to avoid disclosure of all the information cellphones
221 See Baker, supra note 118; see also Hanni Fakhoury, New Court Ruling
Makes it Easier for Police to Track Your Cell Phone, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (July 31, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/07/fifth-circuit-
approves-warrantless-cell-phone-tracking [hereinafter Fakhoury, New Court
Ruling] (“[T]he ‘third party doctrine’—the idea you have no expectation of
privacy in information turned over to third parties—is dangerously eroding our
Fourth Amendment protection at a time when cell phone companies and Internet
service providers are stockpiling extensive personal information about all of us.”).
222 See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data,
724 F.3d 600, 614 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that cell phone use is not required by
the government, but rather, is voluntary).
223 Planet of the Phones, ECONOMIST (Feb. 28, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21645180-smartphone-ubiquitous-
addictive-and-transformative-planet-phones.
224 Can You Imagine Life Without A Cell Phone?, NORTHEAST TIMES (June
19, 2013), http://www.northeasttimes.com/2013/jun/19/can-you-imagine-life-
without-cell-phone/#.V9sH5WXSeRs.
225 Fakhoury, A National Consensus, supra note 168.
226 Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 859 (Mass. 2014).
227 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
228 HARRIS INTERACTIVE, JUMIO, 2013 MOBILE CONSUMER HABITS
STUDY 3 (2013), http://pages.jumio.com/rs/jumio/images/Jumio%20-
%20Mobile%20Consumer%20Habits%20Study-2.pdf.
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reveal is essentially by not using one.229However, this is not a viable
choice. It would be impractical for a person not to use a cellphone
in present day society, and inaccurate to say that one assumes the
risk when using a cellphone. In Smith, Justice Marshall noted in his
dissent that “[i]t is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts
where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic
alternative.”230 Justice Brennan made a similar finding in his dissent
in Miller by recognizing that “[f]or all practical purposes, the
disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs
to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to
participate in the economic life of contemporary society without
maintaining a bank account.”231 In today’s world, there is no
practical alternative to using a cellphone if one wishes to actively
participate in contemporary society.
Admittedly, the third-party doctrine does serve a legitimate
purpose when applied in an appropriate context. The doctrine
“ensures technological neutrality of the Fourth Amendment by
blocking the opportunistic use of third parties to circumvent the
basic balance of Fourth Amendment rules.”232 The use of third
parties essentially has a “substitution effect” by allowing
wrongdoers to take “public aspects of their crimes and replace them
with private transactions,” effectively allowing suspects to hide their
criminal activities from public observation.233 For example, a mob
boss might have subordinates act through his orders, a stalker might
call his victim rather than physically stalking her, and a computer
hacker might infiltrate computers located miles away from his
location.234 In all of these scenarios, the wrongdoer is committing
his crime through a third party while avoiding public detection.235
The third-party doctrine prevents wrongdoers from evading
detection through the use of third parties and properly preserves the
229 State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 641 (N.J. 2013).
230 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
231 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
232 Orin S. Kerr, The Case For The Third-party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV
561, 566 (2009).
233 Id. at 573.
234 Id. at 576.
235 Id.
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Fourth Amendment’s balance between an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy and the government’s interest in preventing
criminal activity.236
There are notable differences between wrongdoers knowingly
using third parties to commit crimes versus cellphone users,
potentially unknowingly, generating CSLI or any other form of
location information. Of course, a cellphone user could be
discussing criminal activity on the call that generates the CSLI
record. However, that information would be within the content of
the call, and not produced by incidental CSLI records. The typical
cellphone user generating CSLI is not acting through a third party to
commit a crime while avoiding public detection.
Ultimately, the fact that CSLI is delivered to a third party should
not diminish a cellphone user’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
A cellphone user is not knowingly and voluntarily conveying any
information to a third party, and whether they know they are
conveying the information or not, have no choice but to reveal this
information to a third party. It is also questionable whether the
doctrine is even compatible with modern technological
advancements. Further, location information reveals intimate details
about an individual’s life.237 As such, users have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in these records.
VII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Ultimately, courts should use a multifactor test before applying
the third-party doctrine. Before applying the doctrine, courts should
consider the following: (1) whether an individual knowingly
conveys information to a third party; (2) whether the information
was conveyed to a third party by a direct act of an individual or as a
byproduct of a separate act; (3) whether an individual was using a
third party during the commission of a crime; (4) the amount of
intimate details revealed by the records at issue; and (5) the
ubiquitous nature of the actions which led to information being
236 Id. at 564.
237 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (noting that location information can reveal a “wealth of detail about
[an individual’s] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations”).
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released to a third party balanced against the practicality of
abstaining from such an act. Using this multifactor test can truly
preserve the spirit of the third-party doctrine, while adequately
affording individuals Fourth Amendment protections.
One potential solution to the problems posed by the third-party
doctrine is an elaboration or ruling on the doctrine stating that only
records a person knowingly conveys to a third party will invoke the
doctrine. Under this proposal, the true purpose of the doctrine can
be preserved simultaneously with guaranteed Fourth Amendment
protections; information that an individual knowingly and
voluntarily turns over to third parties will not be afforded protection,
while information that is unknowingly, and therefore not voluntarily
conveyed, will still be afforded Fourth Amendment protection. This
guarantees that certain information, such as CSLI, will be afforded
protection under the Fourth Amendment. This standard, standing
alone, could prove to be problematic, however, as it may prove too
difficult to demonstrate what a person knowingly conveys to third
parties, especially in the CSLI context.
In conjunction with the third-party doctrine applying only to
information an individual knowingly turns over to third parties, an
additional ruling that the doctrine will not apply to information that
is generated as a byproduct of a separate act would also preserve the
spirit of the third-party doctrine, while sufficiently affording Fourth
Amendment protections. In other words, courts should look at how
third parties obtain the information the government is seeking. The
doctrine should apply only if the information was conveyed to a
third party as a direct, affirmative act of an individual, not if the
information was conveyed as a byproduct of a separate act. For
instance, individuals directly convey their banking information to a
third party when they hand a direct deposit slip to a teller; the
depositor is committing a direct affirmative act in conveying
information to the teller. However, individuals do not affirmatively
convey their location information to a cellphone provider when they
use their cellphone. Instead, the cellphone user’s affirmative act is
turning on their phone, making a phone call, or sending a text
message; the generation of a CSLI record is no more than a
byproduct of that affirmative act. Excluding the doctrine’s
application to information generated as a byproduct can preserve the
purpose of both the Fourth Amendment and the third-party doctrine.
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Another solution may be to apply the doctrine only when it can
be determined that a suspect is using a third party during the
commission of a crime. For instance, the court should apply the
doctrine when a cellphone user makes calls to harass or threaten
somebody, but not when a cellphone is being used for legitimate
purposes, such as calling a friend or checking emails. This approach
could preserve the balance between an individual’s privacy interests,
and the government’s interest in preventing criminal activity.
Further building off Riley and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
in Jones, courts should consider the amount of intimate details that
can be revealed by the information at issue. Cellphones have
immense storage capacity and can contain a variety of personal
information.238 An individual’s daily movements can also reveal
very personal details.239 The Court should then use a balancing test
often utilized in Fourth Amendment cases, whereby the Court
balances “the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and . . . the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”240 Here, the
procurement of CSLI is highly intrusive on individual privacy and
the need for law enforcement to procure this information without a
warrant is relatively low. The government could still obtain these
records with a warrant if they have probable cause to do so, and it
would be a relatively rare occurrence where it would be impractical
for the government to obtain a warrant due to an immediately
pressing exigency.
Finally, courts should consider the ubiquitous nature and
necessity of an individual’s action(s) that led to information being
conveyed to a third party. Courts should assess the practicality of
abstaining from that act as well. For instance, for many individuals,
having a bank account—and therefore conveying information to a
third-party bank—is necessary to function in contemporary society.
Similarly, cellphones could also be considered necessary for most
individuals functioning in today’s society. Not having a bank
238 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484, 2489–90 (2014).
239 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that
location information can reveal a “wealth of detail about [an individual’s]
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations”).
240 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2478 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
300 (1999)).
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account or cellphone today is impractical. As Justice Marshall
noted, “[i]t is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as
a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.”241
Another more viable solution, at least in terms of CSLI, is a
Supreme Court ruling that expressly holds that CSLI is protected by
the Fourth Amendment and its procurement requires a warrant. The
probable cause for a warrant standard applied to CSLI will guarantee
Fourth Amendment protections as the SCA holds the government to
a lesser standard.242 No matter how courts arrive at this conclusion,
they should ultimately give CSLI and similar location information
Fourth Amendment protections.
CONCLUSION
Technology has developed significantly since the Fourth
Amendment was ratified. It is inconceivable that the Framers could
have envisioned how the Fourth Amendment would apply to
location information generated from cellphones and similar devices.
As such, courts are tasked with applying the Fourth Amendment to
searches and seizures involving new technologies. As a result of the
Supreme Court taking on this task, the reasonable expectation of
privacy test and third-party doctrine has emerged. Ultimately, the
circuit courts that have decided Fourth Amendment challenges to
government’s procurement of CSLI have wrongly applied the
reasonable expectation of privacy test and the third-party doctrine.
As CSLI and location information alike reveal intimate, personal
details about an individual, one has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in such information. Additionally, the third-party doctrine
should not universally apply to CSLI or any other location
information, but rather, only to information that is both knowingly
and voluntarily conveyed to third parties. It is erroneous to conclude
that cellphone users knowingly and voluntarily convey this
information to third parties. Courts should ultimately use the
241 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
242 See Babst, supra note 180, at 369; see also In reApplication of the United
States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 606 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The
[SCA’s] ‘specific and articulable facts’ standard is a lesser showing than the
probable cause standard that is required by the Fourth Amendment to obtain a
warrant.”).
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multifactor test proposed above when determining whether the
third-party doctrine applies. No matter how courts come to this
conclusion, such a holding is imperative to extend Fourth
Amendment protections to CSLI which may reveal personal,
intimate details, and that one would have an absolute reasonable
expectation of privacy in.
